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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we study fiscal discipline in the enlarged European Union (EU). Our general 
measure of fiscal discipline is based on satisfying Maastricht fiscal criteria, as it requires 
fiscal discipline by the new members before their entry to the EMU. We examine the 
performance of the ten EU newcomers, as well as the Eurozone by using alternative 
measures of fiscal discipline and employing tests that allow for structural breaks. We also 
include some estimates of the impact of fiscal deficits on interest rates, providing some 
extension of earlier studies (i.e., Knot and de Haan, 1995). Since the underlying idea in 
fiscal rules of the EU is debt sustainability, our paper is related to recent studies on debt 
sustainability of developed and developing countries (e.g., Uctum, Thurston and Uctum, 
2006; Uctum and Wickens, 2000), as well as fiscal sustainability in the EU15 in general 
(i.e., Afonso and Rault, 2007; Hughes Hallett and Lewis, 2007). However, we are interested 
in the question of how the EU countries are developing in terms of heterogeneity (rather 
than sustainability) of their fiscal performance on their path to a monetary union. Our 
results suggest poor fiscal discipline in the EU in general. More importantly, we find that 
the new members are as undisciplined as the EU15, if not more. Since the outcome of the 
estimations imply that monetary unions may not provide fiscal discipline, we offer ideas for 
the EU newcomers on improving their fiscal performance in order to meet the Maastricht 
criteria, aside from the monetary ones discussed by Kutan and Orlowski (2006). In terms of 
country coverage of the new EU member states, our paper is related to Hughes Hallett and 
Lewis (2007), but their focus is on fiscal sustainability, rather than fiscal convergence and 
discipline. They study debt dynamics for the eight new members from Central and Eastern 
Europe that are part of our sample as well. 
Our study is important for several reasons. First, fiscal discipline in the EU has been 
receiving increasing attention since the formulation of the convergence criteria under the 
Maastricht treaty. 1  The two fiscal criteria limiting the deficit and debt ratios within a 
 
1 See, for example, Glick and Hutchison (1993), Hutchison and Kletzer (1995), and Watson (1997). 
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percentage of GDP have come under sharp scrutiny.2 These conditions were set to allow 
qualifying countries to form the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. After this 
formation, empirical literature has turned to analyzing the new EU fiscal framework under 
the Stability and Growth Pact and its reform.3 Our study provides a different perspective on 
fiscal discipline via an explicit comparison of the fiscal convergence during accession, 
membership and the Stability Growth Pact. 
Second, in May 2004, ten new members joined the EU.4 All of these countries must 
join the Eurozone once they satisfy the Maastricht criteria; Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003 
and 2006) show that at least some new members have already achieved a sufficient degree 
of business cycle synchronization. Although EU accession leaves new members some 
freedom to select how to link their national currencies to the euro, the new EU countries 
must first complete their restructuring process and become more like the core EU members 
in terms of a broad range of macroeconomic indicators. The sooner they do so, the more 
likely and faster they are to adopt the euro (e.g., Salvatore 2004). Understandably, several 
observers have raised concerns about the fiscal indiscipline of some new members.5 Many 
of the new EU members have therefore been put under the Excessive Deficit Program 
(EDP) since their entry in 2004. In this respect, our empirical study of fiscal discipline 
offers a way to evaluate the necessity for the EDP. 
Third, although the analysis of the fiscal discipline of the 10 new members is 
understudied in comparison to the core EU15, a comparison of the fiscal performance of 
the new 10 members against the core EU15 is missing in the literature.  
 
2 See, for example, Corsetti and Roubini (1995), and Holzman, Herve and Demel (1996). 
3 Buti and Giudice (2002), Orban and Szapary (2004), Tanzi (2004), Eichengreen (2005), Eijffinger (2005), 
Feldstein (2005), and Schuknecht (2005). 
4 Eight of them were Central and Eastern European countries (hereafter the CEE8), namely the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The other new 
members were Cyprus and Malta. 
5 Berger, Kopits and Szekély (2004) point out that deteriorating fiscal performance, especially in Central 
European countries, may constrain these members from satisfying the Maastricht criteria successfully because 
continuing large fiscal deficits can create inflationary pressures. Further arguments in the same spirit are 
voiced by De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004).  
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Fourth, studying fiscal discipline and convergence in a monetary union is important 
for several reasons. First of all, evidence indicates a direct relationship between fiscal 
policy and macroeconomic performance. In their study of discretionary fiscal policy for 91 
countries, Fatás and Mihov (2003) conclude that “governments that use fiscal policy 
aggressively induce significant macroeconomic instability” in the form of output volatility.6 
Second, there is ample evidence that fiscal convergence is systematically associated with 
enhanced business cycle synchronization as it eliminates idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. And 
finally, there is proof of reduced primary fiscal deficits (or higher surpluses) increasing the 
coherence of business cycles across countries (Darvas, Rose, and Szapáry, 2005; Artis, 
Fidrmuc, and Scharler, 2008). Therefore, since both the Maastricht convergence criteria 
and the Stability and Growth Act require fiscal discipline before entry to the EMU, they 
indirectly move EU closer to an optimum currency area in the sense of Mundell (1961). 
Thus, it is argued that the increased business cycle coherence due to fiscal discipline makes 
countries within the region better candidates for a currency union (Darvas et al. 2005). 
Further, reducing or even removing independence in fiscal policy means removing a source 
of asymmetric shocks, hence moving towards monetary integration faster. Finally, fiscal 
discipline or lack of it may affect financial markets (Afonso and Rault, 2007), and different 
fiscal outcomes in individual members may slow down the financial market integration, if 
different countries have different risk premiums in bonds markets, reflecting the size of 
their expected budget deficit and debt. In this respect, Knot and de Haan (1995) find that 
persistent government deficits were associated with higher interest rates in the European 
Community during 1960-89 period. In a recent study, Poghosyan and de Haan (2007) find 
limited financial integration in the EU when they examine the largest EMU economies: 
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.  
 
6 In a similar spirit based on the data from the U.S. states, Fatás and Mihov (2004) state that “fiscal policy is a 
significant source of business cycle volatility among the U.S. states, and, as a result, constraints on politicians 
lead to less volatile economic fluctuations.” 
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Fifth, our study is related to the literature on the empirical link between fiscal 
discipline and the choice of an exchange rate regime.7 In a similar spirit, we investigate 
whether monetary unions like EMU may provide fiscal discipline for both the new and core 
members. Some observers have argued that the two key features of EU, namely, the 
centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy, may encourage member 
countries to pay closer attention to inflation; hence monetary convergence can be more 
important than fiscal discipline (Feldstein, 2005).8 On other hand, Orlowski (2004) finds 
that foreign exchange risk is pronounced in several new-EU countries and there exist a 
common source of the foreign exchange risk propagation, which is a questionable outlook 
of their fiscal policies. Our empirical results, which also include some estimates of the 
impact of fiscal deficits on interest rates, may provide indirect and some partial support to 
the claims about the costs of fiscal indiscipline. 
In the next section, we briefly summarize the existing theoretical and empirical 
studies. In sections 3 and 4, we describe our methodology and data. Empirical results are 
reported in Section 5. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Related Studies and Our Contribution  
2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Studies 
Restoy (1996) theoretically analyzes the market-generated mechanisms disciplining fiscal 
and financial policy in a monetary-union regime in contrast to the fixed exchange rate 
arrangement. Under both regimes, interest rates depend positively on debt and deficit. 
However, according to the model, only for those countries with moderate debt ratios, the 
cost of financing public debt is higher within a monetary union than under a fixed-
exchange-rate regime. The findings support the hypothesis that undisciplined governments 
 
7 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and. Tornell and Velasco (1995, 1998, and 2000) and the references cited 
within. 
8 For evidence on monetary convergence within new EU members, see Kočenda (2001), Kutan and Yigit 
(2004, 2005), and Brada et al. (2005). These studies report empirical evidence of considerable monetary 
convergence, supporting the theoretical argument above. 
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may find fewer incentives to reduce their deficit and debt ratios as a junior member of a 
monetary union than they find when they are able to issue their own currency.9 
 Based on a simple game theoretical framework where agents agree on the long-term 
goals, Onorante (2004) shows that fiscal constraints lead to implicit coordination 
characterized by lower deficits, low interest rates and controlled inflation. Further, fiscal 
activism is always increased by the entry into the monetary union in which the capacity of a 
central bank to keep inflation close to targets is much smaller than in the one-country case. 
Finally, a strategy of convergence in public finances prior to entry in a monetary union may 
be preferable both for acceding country and the stability of the existing monetary union. To 
sum up, the model provides an argument for benefits of fiscal discipline with respect to the 
integration and existence of a monetary union, and helps us extend the conclusions we can 
derive from our empirical findings. 
Like theoretical studies, there are scant empirical analyses on fiscal policy 
coordination in the EU countries. Knot and de Haan (1995) estimate a reduced form 
equation of nominal interest rates in the European Community during the period from 1960 
to 1989. The results indicate a strong linkage between fiscal variables and the interest rate 
at a European level than at the national level. Moreover, they find that deficit financing is 
not neutral in the European Community, as their results show that budget deficits raised 
interest rates. 
Sanz and Velázquez (2003) test whether the convergence of the composition of 
government expenditures is greater for EU member states than in the non-EU countries of 
the OECD. Using data from 1970 to 1997, they find that EU member states are converging 
towards a different steady state composition of government expenditures and their 
convergence is faster than the non-EU countries of the OECD. Finding different steady 
states for each country suggests that each country has its own individual functional 
 
9 Restoy (1996) shows that the default risk of a fiscally undisciplined member in a fixed exchange rate regime 
will reflect on the member’s interest rate. 
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distribution of public expenditure in the long term, indicating lack of sustainable EU fiscal 
policy. 
Arestis, Khan, and Luintel (2002) voice that the notion that a sustainable fiscal 
arrangement is a must for a viable monetary union. In their comparison of the Eurozone 
deficit with the US federal deficit, they find (i) fiscal discipline measured by fiscal 
convergence in most of the countries and by the achievement of 3% criteria by all Euro-
countries immediately before the launch of the Euro; (ii) similar magnitudes and variability 
of deficit in EU and US, and (iii) that Euro-area is subject to smaller fiscal shocks than the 
US. Our research may also be considered as extending their results as we compare the 
pilgrims against the core EU members. 
Faini (2006) investigate the link between fiscal policy and interest rates in the 
European context and found that an expansionary fiscal policy in one EMU member will 
have an effect both on its spreads and on the overall level of interest rates for the currency 
union as a whole. Finding that the second effect is quantitatively much more significant 
suggests that there are substantial spillovers, through the interest rate channel, among fiscal 
policies of member countries. To limit countries’ incentive to run expansionary fiscal 
policies, a set of rules, like those embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact, is needed.  
Finally, Afonso and Rault ( 2007) investigate whether public finances in the EU15 
are sustainable, using panel unit root tests allowing for structural breaks.  They also test for 
cointegration between general government expenditures and revenues and find 
cointegration. They conclude that fiscal policy was generally sustainable for the EU15 
panel, although some individual countries had problems. 
 
2.2 Our Contribution 
Given limited studies on fiscal discipline, in particular, for the new-EU states, and its 
importance for EU policymakers, we provide a comprehensive empirical study on fiscal 
convergence of the new EU members against that of EU15. We relate the fiscal discipline 
to the progress in managing public finances and specific risks that policymakers in the new 
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members must overcome in the process of joining the Eurozone. To measure fiscal 
discipline based on fiscal convergence (to different benchmarks), we employ beta- and 
sigma-convergence tests, allowing for structural breaks. Towards this end, we use a test 
developed by Vogelsang (1998) which is particularly suitable for analyzing absolute 
convergence.10 In this approach we are confronted with the existing empirical evidence on 
structural breaks in many economic indicators during the transition and pre-accession 
process in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. 11  Since such structural 
breaks in economic series may distort the findings, we employ the modified version of the 
Vogelsang test that allows for structural breaks (see Methodology section for details). Since 
this method not only allows for structural breaks but is also flexible enough to allow 
researchers to derive convergence estimates reliably, it yields more reliable inferences 
about fiscal convergence than those found in earlier studies. 
One of the ways to test for the fiscal discipline of the new members towards the EU 
is to compare their distance from convergence criteria as set in the Maastricht Treaty: (1) 
fiscal deficit up to 3% of GDP and (2) national debt up to 60% of GDP. In this respect we 
do not dispute or discuss the choice of the two ratio-values. Instead we complement the 
previous criteria with an alternative way of measuring the fiscal discipline in the EU 
newcomers with respect to the two synthetic benchmarks: (1) the EU core represented by 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, and (2) the EU periphery 
represented by Greece, Portugal, and Spain. This alternative measure of fiscal discipline is 
in the spirit of the Stability and Growth Act since we test whether any of the new EU 
members have been performing like the old EU countries (EU15). This tells us whether the 
 
10 Until recently, the cross-sectional tests used in analyzing absolute convergence were criticized for over-
rejection of the null hypothesis of no convergence (Bernard and Durlauf 1996), shifting the emphasis to 
conditional and stochastic convergence. However, the need to meet the EU criteria for full EMU membership 
has regenerated interest in absolute convergence. 
11 See Dibooglu and Kutan (2001), Fidrmuc and Tichit (2004), and Kočenda (2005), among others. Further, it 
has to be recognized that the transition alone represented a massive structural shift by definition. 
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new EU members are as fiscally disciplined as the EU15 countries.12 Hence, our empirical 
results have important implications or the disciplining effects of market-based mechanisms 
in monetary unions as discussed in the theoretical literature (e.g., Restoy, 1996). In this 
regard, our paper may be related to the literature on the empirical link between fiscal 
discipline and the choice of an exchange rate regime as well (Tornell and Velasco, 1995, 
1998, and 2000). Our study is also related to the literature that investigates the link between 
fiscal policy and interest rates in the European context (i.e., Knot and de Haan, 1995, and 
Faini, 2006), as it provides some estimates of the impact of the lack of fiscal convergence 
on interest rates. 
 
3. Methodology  
The analysis of convergence used in this paper to infer about fiscal discipline has been an 
active as well as a challenging field of interest since the late 1980s.13 Numerous methods 
have been used to analyze different measures of convergence, namely absolute or 
conditional β-convergence, sigma convergence, and stochastic convergence. While the 
former two types analyzed the issue of catching up, the latter and more recent focused on 
the synchronization of shocks and cross-sectional units moving together in time. The 
enlargement of the EU has refocused interest in the issue of the “catching up” of the new 
entrants to the core EU members. Cross-sectional tests mostly used to analyze β-
convergence were criticized on the grounds of over-rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
convergence (Quah 1996, Bernard and Durlauf 1996). These criticisms pushed researchers 
to apply time series (or panel data) methodologies to introduce a second dimension to β-
convergence. 
 
12 Fiscal prudence is the key issue since governments are conducive to deficits even at the time of the Growth 
and Stability Pact. This behavior is in accord with classical arguments by Kydland and Prescott (1977) or 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977). 
13 For recent discussions, see Taylor (1999) and de la Fuente (2002). 
A new test introduced by Vogelsang (1998, 1999) deals with the β-convergence 
issue by relying on time-series methodology. Following this literature, we consider a simple 
model of convergence towards a benchmark as 
 9
t t ty t x uμ δ γ= + + +  (1) 
where ty  is the difference of the natural logarithm of a variable minus a benchmark, in our 
case for example, the budged deficit-to-GDP ratio of country i minus the Maastricht (or 
other) benchmark at time t would be the ty  variable, while μ is an intercept to capture the 
initial level of the deviation, t is a deterministic time trend, tx  includes control variables if 
any, and ut is the residual term. In such a set-up, β-convergence requires that for countries 
where μ  is initially significantly negative, so the country is lagging behind, the trend 
coefficient δ should have the opposite sign (positive) and be statistically significant. Carlino 
and Mills (1993) developed this test with a very restricted form of serial correlation for the 
residual term, namely AR(2). Vogelsang (1998) extended the analysis of this specification 
to  with an unknown form of serial correlation, allowing for specifications ranging from 
integration of order zero, I(0), to order one, I(1). Since the possibility of no convergence 
implies nonstationarity of the error terms, one can draw a false inference on the trend 
coefficient when the errors are assumed to be stationary AR(2).
tu
14  Vogelsang’s (1998) 
methodology, in the spirit of Equation 1, considers the following Partial Sums with J 
correction (PSW) test statistic that helps to alleviate the above problems.15 It is defined as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(( ))
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1 1ˆ ˆ 100 expT z TPSW T R r R X X R R r T s bJ mβ β
−−
− −′ ⎡ ⎤′ ′= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
2
                                                
 (2) 
 
14 When  is I(1), the estimate of β obtained from the above regression is not related to the true trend, and 




15 See Vogelsang (1998) for further test statistics and a deeper elaboration of the tests. 
where X and β consist of [ ]1 t  and [ ]μ δ  respectively,  is the standard deviation of 
the partial cumulated sum of 
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ty  and JT is the Park and Choi (1988) unit root test statistic 
obtained from the following regression 
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In other words, JT is the Wald statistic that tests the joint hypothesis of 
. In Monte Carlo simulations, Vogelsang (1998) finds the values of b 
and m for which the above tests would be comparable and valid for every type of serial 
correlation form, including unit roots. 
2 3 0mc c c= = = =
Despite the great flexibility of these tests in deriving the mean and trend coefficient 
estimates in time series with varying stationarity properties, one needs to be careful in using 
this methodology in the analysis of post-transition economies. The reason stems from the 
volatile nature of these economies and the presence of structural shifts that are documented 
in the empirical literature. The problem of structural breaks during the transition process is 
given serious empirical consideration in Fidrmuc and Tichit (2004) who provide evidence 
of significant breaks for macroeconomic data. They argue that empirical analyses of 
transition economies must account for the possibility of structural changes, otherwise 
inferences are misleading. However, only a few papers consider the structural breaks on 
transition issues (see, for example, Dibooglu and Kutan 2001, and Kočenda 2005).  
We obtain robust results by using Vogelsang’s (1999) methodology that allows for 
structural breaks in the modification of the statistics by including the possibility of shifts in 
the trend function. The test has been designed in two versions: one with predetermined 
breaks and the other with endogenous break selection. We favor the latter one. First, we 
estimate the break date using the optimal tests of Andrews and Ploberger (1994). Then, 
using the estimated break date, normalized critical values are obtained using the following 
altered version of Equation (1) 
 10
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t 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2t t t t t ty DU DU DT DT x uμ μ δ δ γ= + + + + +
b b
 (4) 
where  (the break date) and zero otherwise, 1 1 if tDU t T= ≤ 2 1 if tDU t T= >
2t bt T
 and zero 
otherwise,  if  and zero otherwise, and finally DT1tDT t= t ≤ bT = − bt T> if  and zero 
otherwise. 
To derive inferences on fiscal discipline we test the significance and the opposite 
signs in the pair of coefficients, 1 1,μ δ  and 2 , 2μ δ . The null hypothesis is that trend 
coefficients are equal to zero, which in our framework translates to no trend in 
developments of budget deficit or debt. An alternative hypothesis of trend coefficients 
being statistically different from zero indicates existence of positive or negative trends in 
developments of both measures, depending on the sign. In particular, finding of 
(statistically significant) mean and trend coefficients with opposite signs indicates how 
countries with different starting positions approach the benchmark. As an example consider 
the dependent variable being the budget deficit (surplus) to GDP ratio in country i minus 
the 3% deficit benchmark. Then a positive intercept indicates a surplus or a deficit ratio 
below 3% since the negative 3% benchmark subtracted from a less negative deficit ratio 
yields positive value. Accordingly, a positive trend coefficient indicates improving 
comparative fiscal stance. The reverse follows for the opposite combination of signs. We 
supplement these results by tests of σ-convergence 16  since confirmation of absolute 
convergence requires both β- and σ-convergence.  
Granted that the Vogelsang (1999) methodology allows for only a single break, and 
it is desirable to use methodologies allowing for more breaks like Bai and Perron (BP 
henceforth, 1998), the data availability and the performance of BP under I(1) errors prevent 
us from pursuing alternative methodologies. Uctum et al. (2006) analyze the mean 
reversion of the debt of developed and developing countries to examine sustainability by 
using a combination of the BP and Zivot and Andrews (1992) tests. These tests revolve 
                                                 
16 Sigma-convergence occurs when the cross-sectional standard deviation of a variable for a group of 
economies decrease in time. 
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around the same idea by testing for the mean reverting trends and temporary fluctuations 
around them in the existence of breaks, hence, broken trend stationarity. We prefer the 
Vogelsang methodology since it gives more accurate inference on the trend functions, and 
breaks in them, regardless of the (non)stationarity of the data series.17 This way, one does 
not have to test for the stationarity of the series around the trend values to evaluate 
convergence to benchmarks (or debt sustainability in the case of Uctum et al., 2006). 
Finally, we complement our analysis with a panel study of long-term interest rates to show 
the potential cost of fiscal indiscipline. 
 
4. Data and Sample Period 
We assess fiscal discipline of the CEE8, Cyprus, and Malta using the official Maastricht 
criteria of the deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios. We further examine fiscal discipline 
of these countries with respect to two naturally produced benchmarks. These are deficit and 
debt ratios achieved in the core of the EU, represented by the average values in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, and the EU periphery, represented by 
average values from Greece, Portugal and Spain. An analysis of the deficit and debt ratios 
is also consistent with testing the theoretical implications of the disciplining effects of 
monetary unions. We include GDP growth as a control variable in the deficit regressions in 
order to incorporate cyclical effects on deficit. 
We use quarterly data from 1995:1 through 2005:4 for variables under research. The 
time span was chosen because: 1) official EU membership applications started in 1995, and 
2) EuroStat began using the harmonized time series on macroeconomic variables at that 
time, and 3) consistent data are available for all countries through end of 2005. In addition, 
the post-1995 period excludes the major transition-related shocks observed in the early 
1990s. The data are obtained primarily from the EuroStat database and checked for 
consistency against the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. In case of missing or 
incomplete observations, data are gathered from the individual central banks and finance 
 
17 The determination of the structural break date in Uctum et al (2006) and our paper is quite similar. 
ministries.18 We also annualize the quarterly debt and deficit data by summing the four 
quarters and then using this sum to obtain the deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios. We 
should reiterate at this point that the serial correlation generated by the methodology used 
for de-seasonalizing the data is of little concern here since the Vogelsang test is able to 
handle broad forms of serial correlation. Finally, we built a monthly dataset from Global 
Financial Database, which we use in our complementary interest rate regressions. The data 
consists of 10-year government bond yields and the control variables, industrial production 
and inflation, with a sample range from 2000:01 to 2005:12. 
 
5. Empirical Findings  
The Vogelsang test results are displayed in Tables 1 through 2. They display the results for 
PSW (Partial Sums with J correction) tests, given by the specification in Equation 2. The 
last column in each table contains the estimated break date using the maximum  
statistic of Andrews and Ploberger (1994). Following the theoretical grounds of the 
methodology employed, we apply a 10% trimming from each end of the sample since the 
break dates close to the endpoints are unreliable and should mostly be disregarded. We 
display the test statistics below the coefficient estimates and the asymptotic critical values 





When interpreting results, the readers should note that positive trend coefficients 
represent improvements of fiscal position in comparison to the Union, suggesting that 
pilgrims are better disciplined than the old Union members.. For instance, a positive trend 
coefficient shows new members’ fiscal position is improving further, away from the 3% 
deficit benchmark. In short, a positive trend coefficient is always good. We supplement this 
 13
                                                 
18 In some cases, quadratic interpolation of annual data was necessary to fill some missing data points because 
the empirical methodology we use relies on uninterrupted data. Quadratic interpolation of annual data was 
used for debt in the case of Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and for the Portuguese 
deficit and second half of the Greek deficit. 
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brief explanation at the bottom of each table by indicating the dependent variable and 
providing a brief guideline to interpret the results easily. 
The dependent variables in the analyses are the ratio of the budget deficit (surplus) 
to GDP and total debt to GDP in a new member country minus the benchmarks, 3% for 
deficit and 60% for total debt. Since all deficits (debt) are indicated by a negative number 
(e.g., minus 2% stands for two percent deficit), all mean values that are positive indicate 
surplus or deficit (debt) ratios below (less negative) 3% (60%), values that are zero indicate 
deficit (debt) of exactly 3% (60%), and values that are negative indicate deficit (debt) ratios 
greater than 3% (60%). As the GDP growth is used as a control variable accounting for 
cyclical deficit movements, we modify the test specification according to the choice of 
benchmark. While we use the country specific growth levels in the 3% benchmark 
regressions for instance, we prefer growth deviations for the core and periphery regressions. 
Accordingly, negative trend coefficients depict deficit (debt) increases (or declining budget 
surpluses) with respect to the benchmark, suggesting fiscal indiscipline relative to the 
benchmark, and positive coefficients suggest just the opposite (fiscal discipline). 
As a complementary measure of fiscal discipline, we also report the σ-convergence 
tests to be able to test whether the fiscal position of the pilgrims are diverging or 
converging towards the core and periphery EU members. We illustrate the σ-convergence 
levels graphically. One should note that since the sigma (standard deviation in our case) is 
calculated cross-sectionally, then the choice of benchmark does not alter the results. 
 
5.1 Fiscal Discipline: Budget Deficit results  
Table 1 examines whether the mean and trend coefficients of Equation (4) are i) statistically 
different from zero, implying that there is a positive or negative trend in budget deficits 
and, ii) have opposite signs, indicating that countries with higher (or more negative) deficit 
approach the benchmark or each other. Initially, one becomes aware of the fact that the pre-
accession period (before 2000) is represented by significant levels of fiscal indiscipline. 
The pattern that emerges from the table in general is that the earlier fiscal indiscipline 
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subsides as membership gets closer and that the more undisciplined countries tend to 
perform with more discipline than the ones with low deficits.  
The deficit-to-GDP ratio with respect to the benchmark of the core shows in essence 
a confirmation of the 3% benchmark (Table 1) results. All new members worsen their 
deficit position in comparison to the core countries, which can be noted from the 
significantly lower post-break means. Initially, better fiscal positions of these countries in 
comparison to the core implies that their attention was focused elsewhere. In other words, 
the new members have higher unjustified expansion in their deficits than the core countries. 
Czech Republic, Baltic countries and Slovakia are the countries who try to improve on their 
poor pre-break performance by having positive trends in the second half of the sample 
period. The observed fiscal indiscipline conclusion is strengthened even more when we 
compare the new members with the periphery. The drastic difference in fiscal position 
between the new members and the periphery at the beginning of the sample period had not 
only been closed in all countries, but it reverses direction in many countries. This indicates 
that of all the 3 groups the periphery has been the best performer in controlling its 
unjustified deficits. Latvia and Estonia are the only new-EU countries to have a higher 
trend in their budget performance in the second half of the sample period. In short, the 
difference between the new members and the core and periphery regressions point towards 
more fiscal discipline in the EU15 than the ten new members. 
Inspecting Figure 2a for sigma convergence, one notices that the older EU members 
are quite in conjunction with one another while the new 10 members show a very slow 
decline in their cross-sectional standard deviation. Accounting for the average mean deficit 
of each group (Figure 2b) confirms this finding with the deficit condition of the new 
members exhibiting an inferior trend when compared to the older members. The periphery 
countries seem to be the best performers with their constant decline in the mean and 
standard deviation of the deficit ratio while the core countries seem to lose focus after 2001. 
Mean ratio of the newcomers shows no improvement (or decline) with a flat trend during 
the period under research. The old members seem to be converging to a higher than desired 
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equilibrium. From this perspective, convergence of the newcomers in terms of deficit-to-
GDP ratio towards either the core or the periphery looks like a dubious enterprise, 
confirming the necessity of EDP. 
 
5.2 Fiscal Discipline: Debt results 
Convergence of the general government debt-to-GDP ratio towards the Maastricht 
benchmark of 60% as well as towards the core and periphery is displayed in Table 2 and 
Figure 3, in a similar fashion as with the budget deficit. The key dependent variable in 
Table 2 is the consolidated debt–to-GDP ratio in a new member country minus the 60% 
benchmark. A positive number indicates a debt ratio below 60% since the negative 60% 
benchmark subtracted from a less negative debt ratio yields positive values; thus, for 
example, a mean value of 40 means a 20% debt-to-GDP ratio. All countries, except 
Hungary, start with a debt-to-GDP ratio lower than the Maastricht benchmark of 60% since 
the mean coefficients are all positive. The few positive trend coefficients observed in the 
pre-break period either reverse direction or lose significance in the post-break period, 
suggesting that the new member countries are increasing their debt-to-GDP ratio or 
showing lack of fiscal discipline. Countries like Malta and the Czech Republic stand out 
with the large deterioration of their indebtedness towards the benchmark. 
A similar tendency and a clearer picture are observed when the 60% benchmark is 
replaced by the actual debt-to-GDP ratio in the core and the periphery. Again the big debt 
position difference at the beginning of the sample period narrows down the second half due 
to the fiscal indiscipline of the new members. Only Hungary stands out as the consistently 
prudent country among the new members. The other more disciplined countries Estonia and 
Poland seem to adopt fiscal discipline either in post- and pre-2000, respectively, not 
displaying as consistent a picture as Hungary. A quick glance at Figure 3 shows that the 
slight decline in the core’s debt situation, while the high debt of the periphery keeps the 
new members within comparatively acceptable debt positions. However, we can hardly call 
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it a success story because their indebtedness increases in general and its dynamics are 
discomforting. 
Both results from Table 2 and the sigma convergence results in Figure 4a support 
earlier findings, as we observe that the new 10 members have outperformed the EU15 
members, especially before 2001. Afterwards, their fiscal discipline loses some of its 
momentum as the variation of the debt positions of the new ten members evolve at par with 
the core after 2003. Fiscal discipline of the periphery starts to improve after 1996 but loses 
its original dynamics in 1998, further worsening in the recent period. The average debt 
ratios in Figure 4b confirm this finding since the periphery as well as the core show worse 
debt positions than the newcomers. On the other hand, its dynamics point at slowly 
diminishing debt position over the time. The results of the sigma convergence thus support 
better performance of the new members compared to the older ones but this finding is 
confronted with the worsening dynamics of their debt position. 
 
5.3 Financial Costs of Fiscal Indiscipline 
Restoy (1996) shows that the default risk of the fiscally undisciplined member of a fixed 
exchange rate regime will reflect on its interest rate. In line with these claims, we run a 
complementary regression of the effect of the fiscal performance of the new candidates on 
their long run interest rates. We note that these results are preliminary due to lack of 
availability for long term interest rates and the low liquidity of these markets, but the results 
may provide yardstick estimates for future studies. The comprehensive data for long-term 
interest rates are available since 2000 and data are obtained from Global Financial Data. 
We run four regressions on the debt and deficit for full sample and post-2004 (post-EU 
membership) monthly data. 19  All regressions include time trend, German 10-year 
government bond yield, inflation, industrial production, and initial bond yield levels as 
 
19 We interpolate quarterly debt and deficit values using quadratic averaging to match the monthly frequency 
of the other data. 
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control variables. The initial bond yield level picks up the fixed country effects since it is 
time invariant. We report the results in Table 3.20 
Our findings, and especially those for deficit, indirectly support Restoy’s claims 
since the number of significant positive coefficients increase after the countries became the 
EU members (post-2004 results). It is also in line with Knot and de Haan (1995) who 
reported that that persistent government deficit pushed up nominal interest rates in the 
European Community during 1960-89 period. The findings are also consistent with our 
findings above that the new members have outperformed the EU15 members, especially 
before 2001, but their fiscal discipline lost its momentum after 2003. This finding indicates 
that the long term interest rates increased with the breakdown in fiscal discipline, reflecting 
risk (of default) premium. On other hand, countries with relatively flexible exchange 
regime (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) lack statistically significant coefficients for the 
post-2004 period. This finding suggests that, in the exchange rate regime context, other 
factors than government budget may play a role. We do not observe the same clear message 
in the results for the debt estimations, which may be due to short sample period. 
Again, our findings should be taken with caution because of two reasons. First, the 
new EU members are not members of the monetary union in a sense of the Restoy’s model. 
EU membership may enhance potential for more stable exchange rate management by 
central banks but does not substitute for the fixed exchange rate regime. Second, we are 
aware of short data span in our supplementary analysis that might not guarantee stable 
coefficients from longer perspective.  
 
5.4 Policy Implications  
Our results indicate that the ongoing reform of the public finance systems in the whole 
EU25 is an agenda that is not to be underestimated. In the new EU members, this issue is 
even more important, because a neglect of public finance reforms and lack of fiscal 
 
20 Even though maximum heterogeneity is allowed in the panel regression, only average coefficient estimates 
are displayed for space conservation. 
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discipline could lead to serious consequences for these countries, well beyond the 
satisfaction of the Maastricht criteria and the consideration of entry into the Eurozone. 
Another implication is for the authorities in the new EU and old core members to 
better coordinate fiscal and monetary policies to improve fiscal discipline.21 Such a claim is 
supported by our empirical evidence and is consistent with Gleich (2003) who shows that 
countries having institutional structures that are more conducive to strengthening 
coordination and cooperation in budget decision-making have been associated with lower 
budget deficits and reduced debt levels. Consequently, our results are consistent with the 
notion that countries with weak budget institutions tend to have a lower level of fiscal 
discipline. Hence, further and more serious reforms in the areas of budget preparation and 
legislation are necessary to improve fiscal discipline. 
Another policy recommendation is that policymakers need to design policies to 
improve fiscal consolidation. It is widely suggested in the literature that most EU countries 
have been lowering both direct and indirect taxes and although such trends are sensitive to 
the economic cycles experienced by the countries, lowering taxes is consistent with the 
fiscal consolidation. 
EU policymakers may also consider adopting fiscal policy rules, rather than a 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy.22 Some countries, such as Poland and the Netherlands, have 
already introduced fiscal rules into the laws and constitutions (Tanzi, 2005). Of course, the 
fact that the member states have different fiscal positions certainly creates implementation 
problems, at east initially. Tanzi suggests that “flexibility is required as to the time needed 
to conform to the rule, but the rule should not be relaxed to the point of making sinning 




21 See Dixit (2001) and Dixit and Lambertin (2001) for a review of the literature on the interaction of 
monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union. For supporting empirical evidence, see Darnaut and Kutos 
(2005). 
22 For an important early treatment of this issue, see Kydland and. Prescott (1977). 
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6. Conclusion  
Our study examines the fiscal discipline of the new EU members with respect to EU15, 
using alternative measures of fiscal convergence and employing vastly flexible tests of 
convergence, allowing for structural breaks, hence, providing enhanced inference. We 
observe an extent of heterogeneity in fiscal convergence and a lack of discipline in general, 
raising warning signals for the old and new members. This finding may raise concerns 
about the ability of monetary unions to provide fiscal discipline for its members. Moreover, 
the findings on the significant and positive impact of post-2004 fiscal deficits in the new 
member states on their long-term interest rates tentatively show that capital markets may 
require risk premium for any lack of fiscal discipline. An interesting finding is there is no 
positive risk premium evidence for countries with relatively flexible exchange regime 
during the post-2004 period. Our results are preliminary, and therefore further analysis is 




Afonso, António and Christophe Rault, 2007, What Do We Really Know about Fiscal 
Sustainability in the EU? A Panel Data Diagnostic. William Davidson Institute Working 
Paper Number 893, October 2007. 
 
Andrews, Donald W. K. and Werner Ploberger, 1994. Optimal Tests When a Nuisance 
Parameter is Present Only under the Alternative. Econometrica 62(6), 1383-1414.  
 
Arestis, Philip, Mosahid Khan, and Kul B. Luintel, 2002. Fiscal Deficits in Monetary 
Unions: A Comparison of EMU and United States. Eastern Economic Journal, 28(1): 89-
103. 
 
Artis, Michael, Jarko Fidrmuc, and Johann Scharler, 2008. The transmission of business 
cycles: Implications for EMU enlargement . Forthcoming in Economics of Transition. 
 
Bai Jushan, and Pierre Perron. 1998. Estimating and testing linear models with multiple 
structural changes, Econometrica 66; 47-78. 
 
Barro, R, 1990. Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth. Journal 
of Political Economy. 98, 102–25. 
 
Berger, Helge, George Kopits, and István Szekély, 2004. Fiscal Indulgence in Central 
Europe: Loss of the External Anchor? IMF Working Paper WP 04/62. 
 
Bernard, Andrew B. and Steven N. Durlauf, 1996. Interpreting Tests of the Convergence 
Hypothesis. Journal of Econometrics, 71, 161-173. 
 
Brada, Josef C., Kutan, Ali M., and Zhou, Su, 2005. “Real and Monetary Convergence 
between the European Union’s Core and Recent Member Countries: A Rolling 
Cointegration Approach”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 249-70. 
 
Buchanan, J.M. and R.F. Wagner, 1977. Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of 
Lord Keynes. New York, Academic Press. 
 
Buti, Marco and Gabriele Giudice, 2002. Maastricht's Fiscal Rules at Ten: An Assessment. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5): 823-48. 
 
Carlino, G.A. and L.O. Mills, 1993. Are US Regional Incomes Converging? Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 32, 335-346. 
 
 22
Corsetti, Giancarlo and Nouriel Roubini, 1995. Political Biases in Fiscal Policy: 
Reconsidering the Case for the Maastricht Fiscal Criteria. In: Eichengreen, Frieden, and 
von Hagen (eds.), Monetary and fiscal policy in an integrated Europe. European and 
Transatlantic Studies. London: Springer, 118-37. 
 
Darnaut, Nathalie and Paul Kutos, 2005. Poland’s Policy Mix: Fiscal or Monetary 
Leadership. ECFIN Country Focus, 2(1), 1-6 
 
Darvas, Zsolt, Andrew K. Rose, and György Szapáry, 2005. Fiscal Divergence and 
Business Cycles Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic. NBER Working Paper 
No. 11580. 
 
de Grauwe, P. and G. Schnabl, 2004. Nominal Versus Real Convergence with Respect to 
EMU Accession. How to Cope with the Balassa-Samuelson Dilemma. European University 
Institute Discussion Paper RSCAS No. 2004/20. 
 
de la Fuente, Angel. 2002. On the Sources of Convergence: A Close Look at the Spanish 
Regions, European Economic Review, 46, 569–599. 
 
Dibooglu, Selahattin and Ali M. Kutan, 2001. Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
in Transition Economies: The Case of Poland and Hungary, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 29, 257–275. 
 
Dixit, Avinash, 2001. Games of Monetary and Fiscal Interactions in the EMU, European 
Economic Review, 45, 589-613. 
 
Dixit, Avinash and Luisa Lambertini, 2001. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions and 
Commitment versus Discretion in a Monetary Union, European Economic Review, 45, 977-
987. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry, 2005. Europe, the Euro and the ECB: Monetary Success, Fiscal 
Failure. Journal of Policy Modeling, 27(4): 427-39. 
 
Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W., 2005. On a Reformed Stability and Growth Pact. 
Intereconomics/Review of European Economic Policy, 40(3): 141-47. 
 
Faini, Riccardo, 2006. Fiscal policy and interest rates in Europe. Economic Policy 21(47), 
443–489 
 
Fatás, Antonio and Ilian Mihov, 2003. The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1419-1447. 
 23
 
Fatás, Antonio and Ilian Mihov, 2004. The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Rules in the 
US states. CEPR DP No. 4372. 
 
Feldstein, Martin, 2005. The Euro and the Stability Pact. Journal of Policy Modeling, 
27(4): 421-26 
 
Fidrmuc, Jan and Ariane Tichit, 2004. Mind the Break! Accounting for Changing Patterns 
of Growth during Transition, William Davidson Institute Working Paper No 643. 
 
Fidrmuc, J., Korhonen, I., 2003. Similarity of Supply and Demand Shocks between the 
Euro Area and the CEECs, Economic Systems 27(3), 313-334. 
 
Fidrmuc, J., Korhonen, I., 2006. Meta-Analysis of the Business Cycle Correlation between 
the Euro Area and the CEECs, Journal of Comparative Economics 34(3), 518-537. 
 
Giavazzi, Francesco and Marco Pagano, 1988. The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS 
Discipline and Central Bank Credibility, European Economic Review, 32,1055-1075. 
 
Gleich, H., 2003. Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Central and Eastern 
European Countries. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 215. 
 
Glick, Reuven and Michael Hutchison, 1993. Fiscal Policy in Monetary Unions: 
Implications for Europe. Open Economies Review, 4(1): 39-65. 
 
Hughes Hallett, Andrew and John Lewis, 2007. Debt, deficits, and the accession of the new 
member States to the Euro. European Journal of Political Economy, 23: 316– 337. 
 
Holzmann, Robert, Yves Herve, andRoland Demmel, 1996. The Maastricht Fiscal Criteria: 
Required but Ineffective? Empirica, 23(1): 25-58. 
 
Hutchison, Michael M. and Kenneth M. Kletzer, 1995. Fiscal Convergence Criteria, Factor 
Mobility, and Credibility in Transition to Monetary Union in Europe. In: Eichengreen, 
Frieden, and von Hagen (eds.), Monetary and fiscal policy in an integrated Europe. 
European and Transatlantic Studies. London: Springer, 138-65. 
 
Knot, Klaas and Jakob de Haan, 1995, Fiscal Policy and Interest Rates in the European 
Community. European Journal of Political Economy, 11,  171-187 
 
Kočenda, Evžen, 2001. Macroeconomic Convergence in Transition Economies. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 29(1), 1-23. 
 24
 
Kočenda, Evžen, 2005. Beware of Breaks in Exchange Rates: Evidence from European 
Transition Countries, Economic Systems, 29(3), 307-324. 
 
Kutan, Ali and Lucjan Orlowski (2006), “Monetary Convergence to the Euro”, Economic 
Systems, 30, 307-310 
 
Kutan, Ali and Taner Yigit, 2004. Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence of Transition 
Economies. Journal of Comparative Economics 32, 23-36. 
 
Kutan, Ali and Taner Yigit, 2005. Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence: Are the New 
EU Members Ready to Join the Euro Zone? Journal of Comparative Economics, 33, 387-
400. 
 
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott, 1977. Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency 
of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473-492. 
 
Lee K, M. Hashem Pesaran, Ron Smith. 1997. Growth and convergence in multi-country 
empirical stochastic Solow model, Journal of Applied Econometrics; 12(4); 357-92. 
 
Maddison, A., 1991. Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
 
McKinnon, Ronald I., 1999. Toward Virtual Exchange-Rate Stability in Western and 
Eastern Europe with the Advent of EMU, In Mario I. Blejer and Marko Skreb (eds.), 
Balance of Payments, Exchange Rates, and Competitiveness in Transition Economies. 
Boston: Kluwer, 131-158. 
 
Mundell, Robert, 1961. A Theory of Optimum Currency Area. American Economic Review, 
51, 657-665. 
 
Onorante, Luca, 2004. Fiscal Convergence before Entering EMU. In: Liebscher et al (eds.), 
The economic potential of a larger Europe. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: 
Elgar, 2004; 245-59. 
 
Orban, Gabor and Gyorgy Szapary, 2004. The Stability and Growth Pact from the 
Perspective of the New Member States. Journal of Policy Modeling, 26(7): 839-64. 
 
Orlowski, L. (2004), “Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro”, ZEI Working 
Paper, B 25 2004 
 
 25
Park, J. Y. and B. Choi, 1988. A New Approach to Testing for a Unit Root, Working Paper 
#88–23, Department of Economics, Cornell University. 
 
Poghosyan, Tigran and Jakob de Haan (2007). Interest Rate Linkages in EMU Countries: A 
Rolling Threshold Vector Error-Correction Approach. CESifo Working Paper No. 2006. 
 
Quah, D. T. 1996. Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence, European Economic 
Review, 40(6), 1353-75. 
 
Salvatore, Dominick, 2004. Restructuring and Euroization in Accession Countries, Journal 
of Policy Modeling, 26, 889-902. 
 
Sanz, Ismael and Francisco J. Velázquez, 2003. Has the European Integration 
Approximated the Composition of Government Expenditures? A Comparative Analysis 
between the EU and Non-EU Countries of the OECD, Research Paper 2003/09, 
Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalization and Economic Policy, University of 
Nottingham. 
 
Restoy, Fernando, 1996. Interest Rates and Fiscal Discipline in Monetary Unions, 
European Economic Review, 40, 1629-1646. 
 
Schuknecht, Ludger, 2005. Stability and Growth Pact: Issues and Lessons from Political 
Economy. International Economics and Economic Policy, 2(1): 65-89. 
 
Skidmore, Mark, Hideki Toya, and David Merriman, 2004. Convergence in Government 
Spending: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence, Kyklos, 57(4), 587–620. 
 
Tanzi, Vito, 2004. The Stability and Growth Pact: Its Role and Future. Cato Journal, 24(1-
2): 57-69. 
 
Tanzi, Vito, 2005. Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Rules in the European Union, CESIfo Forum, 3, 
57-64. 
 
Taylor, Alan M, 1999. Sources of Convergence in the Late Nineteenth Century, European 
Economic Review, 43, 1621-1645. 
 
Tomljanovich, M. and T. J. Vogelsang, 2002. Are US Regional Incomes Converging? 
Using New Econometric Methods to Examine Old Issues, Empirical Economics, 27, 49-62. 
 
Tornell, Aaron and Andrés Velasco, 2002. Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Which 
Provides More Fiscal Discipline?, Journal of Monetary Economics, 45, 399-436. 
 26
 
Tornell, Aaron and Andrés Velasco, 1998. Fiscal Discipline and the Choice of a Nominal 
Anchor in Stabilization, Journal of International Economics, 46, 1-30. 
 
Tornell, Aaron and Andrés Velasco, 1995. Fiscal Discipline and the Choice of Exchange 
Rate Regime, European Economic Review, 39, 759-770. 
 
Uctum, Merih, Thom Thurston and Remzi Uctum., 2006. Public Debt, the Unit Root 
Hypothesis and Structural Breaks: A Multi-Country Analysis, Economica,73 (289), 129-
156. 
 
Uctum, Merih and Michael Wickens, 2000. Debt and deficit ceilings, and sustainability of 
fiscal policies: An intertemporal analysis. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
62(2), 197-222. 
 
Vogelsang, T. J., 1998. Trend Function Hypothesis Testing in the Presence of Serial 
Correlation, Econometrica, 66, 123-48. 
 
Vogelsang, T. J., 1999. Testing for a Shift in Trend When Serial Correlation is of Unknown 
Form, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper #99-016/4 (last version: Cornell Department of 
Economics, 2001). 
 
Watson, Alison M.S., 1997. Aspects of European monetary integration: The politics of 
convergence. New York: St. Martin's Press; London: Macmillan Press, 1997. 
Table 1: Budget Deficit Convergence to Maastricht Benchmark as well as the core and the 
 PSW test with endogenous break selection *regression 
f h
 
Countries 1μ  1δ  2μ  2δ  Break  
Cyprus - bench. 3.45** (1.57) -0.48* (-1.77) -0.62 (-0.33) -0.02 (-0.27) 1998Q1 
Cyprus - core 3.20* (1.40) -0.34 (-0.75) -2.59** (-2.56) -0.01 (-0.28) 1996Q4* 
Cyprus - perip. 8.01** (2.44) -0.66 (-1.01) -1.06 (-0.73) -0.07 (-0.96) 1996Q4** 
Czech - bench. 3.63** (3.51) -0.24** (-5.01) -3.05 (-1.23) 0.42 (0.91) 2003Q4 
Czech - core 4.74** (4.15) -0.36** (-5.48) -6.07** (-3.78) 0.29* (1.59) 2002Q1** 
Czech -  perip. 9.19** (3.13) -0.51 (-1.11) -1.57 (-0.74) -0.09 (-0.73) 1997Q4 
Estonia - bench. 0.74 (0.41) 0.22 (1.31) 0.25 (0.20) 0.19** (2.49) 1998Q4 
Estonia - core 1.64 (0.82) 0.09 (0.49) -1.30 (-0.95) 0.18** (1.99) 1998Q4 
Estonia -  perip. 6.17** (3.45) -0.17 (-0.95) -0.37 (-0.29) 0.14* (1.61) 1998Q4* 
Hungary - bench. 2.53 (1.14) -0.46* (-1.87) -1.77 (-0.55) -0.10 (-0.80) 1999Q3 
Hungary - core 1.68 (0.55) -0.11 (-0.22) -4.60** (-2.76) -0.01 (-0.15) 1997Q2 
Hungary -  perip. 8.28** (3.08) -0.84** (-3.39) -1.87 (-0.84) -0.15 (-1.03) 1999Q2 
Latvia - bench. 0.46 (0.67) 0.25** (3.41) -0.31 (-0.52) 0.12** (3.81) 1998Q4 
Latvia - core 1.56* (1.36) 0.08 (0.67) -2.21** (-2.40) 0.14** (2.40) 1999Q1* 
Latvia -  perip. 5.98** (6.63) -0.15* (-1.64) -1.07 (-1.56) 0.07* (1.69) 1998Q4** 
Lithuania -  bench. 2.86** (3.32) -0.20** (-3.42) 0.18 (0.21) 0.08 (1.31) 2000Q2 
Lithuania. - core 2.97** (2.75) -0.22** (-2.18) -3.13** (-3.92) 0.13** (2.51) 1999Q1** 
Lithuania -  perip. 7.99** (11.56) -0.54** (-9.82) -0.67 (-1.04) 0.02 (0.36) 2000Q1** 
Malta - bench. -8.82** (-5.14) 0.19** (2.31) -7.87** (-2.76) 0.73* (1.74) 2003Q1 
Malta - core -8.49** (-4.57) 0.10 (1.14) -9.00** (-2.59) 0.72 (1.29) 2003Q2 
Malta -  perip. -1.97* (-1.22) -0.38** (-2.56) -5.16** (-3.87) 0.01 (0.10) 1999Q2 
Poland - bench. -0.30 (-0.44) 0.13** (4.38) -1.60** (-2.86) 0.00 (-0.03) 2001Q3** 
Poland- core 0.51 (0.82) 0.01 (0.31) -2.81** (-4.36) -0.04 (-0.67) 2001Q3 
Poland -  perip. 4.00** (2.17) -0.11 (-1.00) -2.18 (-1.13) -0.12 (-0.59) 2001Q3 
Slovak - bench. -0.17 (-0.06) -0.18 (-1.03) -8.41** (-4.13) 0.42** (2.77) 2000Q1 
Slovak - core 0.37 (0.13) -0.27 (-1.32) -10.46** (-4.83) 0.44** (2.68) 2000Q1* 
Slovak -  perip. 5.36** (2.40) -0.57** (-3.75) -6.67** (-2.84) 0.29 (1.31) 2001Q1* 
Slovenia - bench. 3.07** (7.24) -0.07** (-2.97) 3.49** (5.71) -0.06 (-0.79) 2002Q2 
Slovenia - core 3.73** (7.05) -0.18** (-5.95) 2.87** (3.57) -0.17** (-1.84) 2002Q2** 
Slovenia  perip. 8.18** (6.21) -0.38** (-1.95) 1.03 (1.40) 0.00 (-0.04) 1997Q3** 
Crit. Val.    
5% 1.51 1.88 1.92 1.81  
10% 1.21 1.58 1.65 1.54  
Note: The first dependent variable is the budget deficit (surplus) to GDP ratio in country i minus the 3% 
deficit benchmark (a positive number indicates a surplus or a deficit ratio below 3% since the negative 
3% benchmark subtracted from a less negative deficit ratio yields positive values). For the core 
(periphery), it is the deficit to GDP ratio in country i minus the core (periphery) deficit ratio (hence a 
negative number indicates a deficit ratio worse than that of the core (periphery) and a positive trend 
indicates lowering comparative deficit ratios). Hence, a positive trend coefficient indicates improving 
comparative fiscal stance. GDP growth (differences when necessary) has been used to control for 
cyclicality. The numbers in the parentheses for the above table and those that follow below indicate the 
test statistic associated with the coefficient estimate and are to be compared with the critical values at the 
bottom of the table. **(*) indicates 95%(90%) significance. Significance levels of breaks are determined 




Table 2: Consolidated Debt/GDP Convergence to Maastricht Benchmark as well 
as the core and the periphery 
 PSW test with endogenous break selection (regression of 
ty  with  correction) TJ
 
Countries 1μ  1δ  2μ  2δ  Break  
Cyp - bench. 8.81** (3.99) -0.46** (-2.04) 6.51** (3.99) -0.75** (-7.61) 1998Q4 
Cyp - core 4.05** (1.77) -0.64** (-2.70) -2.57 (-1.52) -0.70** (-6.82) 1998Q4 
Cyp - perip. 32.61** (17.72) -0.83** (-8.83) -0.26 (-0.08) 0.09 (0.18) 2003Q1 
Cze - bench. 51.50** (12.45) -0.26 (-1.33) 25.19** (2.66) 0.27 (0.14) 2003Q4** 
Cze - core 46.11** (12.45) -0.38** (-2.17) 18.08** (2.13) 0.23 (0.13) 2003Q4** 
Cze -  perip. 67.59** (10.66) 0.69 (0.55) 73.55** (26.56) -1.00** (-7.66) 1996Q4 
Est - bench. 50.32** (92.52) 0.19** (5.76) 53.89** (73.38) 0.06 (0.83) 2001Q4** 
Est - core 45.69** (58.02) 0.00 (0.08) 44.50** (44.10) 0.21** (2.17) 2001Q3 
Est -  perip. 74.86** (42.90) -0.33** (-4.03) 67.43** (16.88) -0.06 (-0.08) 2003Q4 
Hun - bench. -18.65** (-3.87) 1.05** (3.11) 8.53 (1.60) -0.44 (-1.00) 2000Q4* 
Hun - core -27.21** (-4.65) 1.38* (1.60) -6.20** (-1.92) 0.05 (0.28) 1997Q3* 
Hun -  perip. -0.21 (-0.04) 1.51 ** (2.46) 16.50 ** (5.41) -0.09 (-0.56) 1998Q1* 
Lat - bench. 49.12** (50.80) 0.00 (0.03) 45.83** (60.75) 0.02 (0.45) 1999Q1 
Lat - core 44.84** (50.76) -0.24** (-3.30) 35.41** (44.20) 0.18** (3.14) 1999Q4** 
Lat -  perip. 73.88** (28.88) -0.60** (-4.94) 58.09** (9.92) 0.22 (0.19) 2003Q4* 
Lit - bench. 36.68** (23.38) 0.01 (0.05) 26.96** (19.90) 0.58** (6.34) 1999Q3** 
Lit - core 31.74** (17.77) -0.14 (-0.89) 17.10** (11.09) 0.69** (6.62) 1999Q3** 
Lit -  perip. 62.12** (17.18) -0.63** (-2.09) 38.29** (11.67) 0.62** (2.70) 1999Q4** 
Mal - bench. 24.97** (11.23) -1.19** (-7.65) 1.92 (0.79) -1.05** (-5.12) 2000Q4 
Mal - core 20.31** (9.98) -1.37** (-9.63) -8.20** (-3.65) -0.87** (-4.67) 2000Q4 
Mal -  perip. 49.12** (11.76) -1.60** (-3.48) 19.16** (6.54) -0.88** (-5.18) 1998Q3 
Pol - bench. 8.93** (3.43) 0.81** (3.00) 20.82** (10.81) -0.23** (-1.95) 1998Q4** 
Pol- core 4.36** (3.35) 0.60** (4.74) 11.29** (11.11) -0.16** (-2.48) 1999Q1* 
Pol -  perip. 33.28** (11.91) 0.33 (1.16) 33.51** (16.20) -0.29** (-2.32) 1998Q4 
Slov - bench. 40.38** (17.98) -0.16 (-1.02) 23.95** (9.67) -0.15 (-0.74) 2000Q4 
Slov - core 35.72** (15.84) -0.34** (-2.16) 13.83** (5.56) 0.02 (0.10) 2000Q4 
Slov -  perip. 65.28** (22.05) -0.72** (-3.48) 34.57** (10.59) -0.09 (-0.33) 2000Q4* 
Slovak - bench. 48.68** (54.04) -0.77** (-9.74) 36.03** (46.32) -0.22** (-4.26) 1999Q3** 
Slovak - core 43.92** (33.29) -0.94** (-7.73) 26.52** (24.48) -0.13* (-1.80) 1999Q2** 
Slovak -  perip. 73.25** (40.31) -1.28** (-8.45) 47.10** (28.58) -0.21** (-1.86) 1999Q4** 
Crit. Val.      
5% 1.51 1.88 1.92 1.81  
10% 1.21 1.58 1.65 1.54  
Note: Values are in percentages. The dependent variable for the benchmark is the consolidated debt to 
GDP ratio in country i minus the 60% benchmark (a positive number indicates a debt ratio below 60% 
since the negative 60% benchmark subtracted form a less negative debt ratio yields positive values). For 
the core (periphery), it is the consolidated debt to GDP ratio in country i minus the core (periphery) debt 
ratio (hence a negative number indicates a debt ratio worse than that of the core (periphery) and a positive 
trend indicates lowering comparative debt ratios). Therefore, a positive trend coefficient indicates 
improving comparative debt position. **(*) indicates 95%(90%) significance. Significance levels of breaks 





Table 3: Effect of deficit/debt on 10-year government bond yields 
 Deficit Debt 
 2000-2005 2004-2005 2000-2005 2004-2005 
Cyprus 0.57** (0.10) 1.89** (0.31) 0.00 (0.03) 0.19* (0.11) 
Czech Rep 0.00 (0.05) -0.09 (0.06) 0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) 
Estonia 0.31 (0.20) 1.46** (0.69) -0.18 (0.45) -1.22 (1.40) 
Hungary -0.15** (0.07) 0.45 (0.30) 0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.07) 
Latvia 0.07 (0.10) 0.07 (0.06) -0.28** (0.09) 0.12 (0.10) 
Lithuania -1.62** (0.14) 0.99** (0.50) -0.09 (0.15) 0.06 (0.07) 
Malta 0.04** (0.02) -0.17** (0.06) -0.06** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Poland 0.36** (0.09) 0.09 (0.18) -0.27** (0.06) 0.08 (0.12) 
Slovak 0.10* (0.06) 1.21** (0.61) 0.02** (0.01) 0.11** (0.03) 
Slovenia -0.22** (0.09) 0.17* (0.09) 0.08 (0.10) -0.08** (0.03) 
Industrial Prod. 0.04 (0.02) 0.04* (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 
Inflation 0.23** (0.07) 0.18** (0.09) 0.26** (0.09) 0.17** (0.08) 
Trend -0.09** (0.04) -0.11** (0.05) -0.08** (0.03) -0.08** (0.04) 
German rate 0.59** (0.30) 0.62** (0.29) 0.54 (0.35) 0.62* (0.34) 
Initial yield 0.49 (0.40) 1.68** (0.48) 0.85** (0.43) 0.91 (0.91) 
Adj. R2 0.93 0.98 0.91 0.97 
DW 0.59 1.90 0.56 1.80 
Notes: The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yields. Coefficient heterogeneity is 
preserved for the control variables, but to conserve space only average values are reported. Standard 
errors are displayed in the parentheses. The standard errors reported for the averaged control variable 
coefficients are the joint sample standard errors. **(*) represents 95(90)% significance. 
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